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Abstract
For vehicle sharing schemes, where drop-off positions are not fixed, we
propose a pricing scheme, where the price depends in part on the distance
between where a vehicle is being dropped off and where the closest shared
vehicle is parked. Under certain restrictive assumptions, we show that this
pricing leads to a socially optimal spread of the vehicles within a region.
Introduction
The numbers of cars on the roads seem ever increasing, with the consequent
issues of congestion on the roads, lack of parking space, and pollution. Car-
sharing schemes, which let members use any car in a fleet, promise to reduce
the issues considerably [1, 2, 3]. Until the penetration of car sharing in any
given area is high enough, however, the distance to travel to pick up a car may
be prohibitive.
In car-sharing systems, where the pick-up and drop-off have to be the same,
e.g. ZipCar, one may optimise the positions and fix them. In the so called
floating-car systems, e.g. car2go [2] and Autolib [4], one may use the shared
car for a one-way journey, often without reservations. Although such flexible,
open-ended use is preferable from the users’ point of view [5, 1], it makes the
system more difficult to operate, because of the costs of balancing the spatial
distribution of cars, which are much higher than in bicycle-sharing schemes. We
hence focus on the question as to how to incentivize the drivers to spread the
cars more evenly.
It seems appropriate that a component of the price paid for sharing the car
should be based on where you drop off the car. Clearly, one could make the price
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proportional to the inverse of the distances between where the car is dropped off
and each other car. That, however, would require knowing the positions of all
other cars, violating the privacy of their drivers. We hence propose two approx-
imations, which use use only the set of distances of k cars parked closest to the
car dropped off and a distance to the boundary, both of which can be obtained
using sensing or short-range wireless radio systems to communicate with parked
cars in the vicinity. Actually, in the simplest case, we propose that the com-
ponent is proportional to the inverse of the distance between where the car is
dropped off and the closest car already parked. In further cases, more elaborate
functions and a small number of already parked cars are considered. Overall,
we show that even the use of such local approximations in the pricing leads to
a uniform distribution of the cars across a region, under certain assumptions.
Specifically, we study two models of dynamics, where drivers try to minimize
the fee incurred, considering the pricing scheme above. Our main findings are:
• The socially optimal positions of cars within an polygonal region, as well
as the best possible outcome of policies that minimize fees incurred, can
be computed.
• In a certain synchronous approximation of the asynchronous dynamics,
the relative positions of cars, whose drivers minimise the proposed fees,
provably converge to a limit that is socially optimal.
• For other pricing functions considered, the relative positions may converge
to a limit, whose cost is far from the social optimum.
Notice that these are only first steps towards pricing with full consideration
of the complex environment of modern cities, with non-convex road systems,
one-way traffic restrictions, and non-uniform and time-varying demands. For
self-driving cars, whose positions can keep changing even after drop-off, the
model seems to be rather realistic. For frequent enough drop-offs, even the
behaviour of humans dropping the cars off, as incentivized by the pricing scheme,
may be well-approximated by the model. Our first results need validation using
proper planning techniques, but possibly open up a large area of research on
the interface of revenue management and control.
The Model
We consider a finite number N of shared cars. Let Q ⊆ R2 denote the region
where these cars can travel, e.g., the metropolitan area the car-sharing scheme
is restricted to. Let ∂(Q) ⊆ R2 denote the boundary of Q. The positions
of parked cars are publicly known. For conveninence, we denote the cars of
known positions by integers K = {1, 2, . . . k}. For a continuous time index
t ∈ [0,∞) Let xu(t) ∈ Q be the position of car u ∈ K at time t. We write
x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xk(t)) to denote all known position of cars at time t. In
discrete-time models, for n = 1, 2, . . ., we use xun ∈ Q for the position of car
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u ∈ K at time n and xn ∈ Qk to denote the corresponding vector of known
positions at time n.
For both discrete and continuous time, we define a common notion of in-
convenience U∗(x, u) of car u ∈ K parked at position xu ∈ Q relative to the
aggregate position x ∈ Qk:
max
{
1
miny∈∂(Q) ||y − xu|| ,
2
minv∈K,v 6=u ||xu − xv||
}
, (1)
where miny∈∂(Q) ||y − xu|| is the distance from xu to the boundary of Q and
where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm. We think of it as the inconvenience cost
of the location of car u to the potential participants of the shared car scheme.
Intuitively, parking a car u near another shared car v incurs a “redundancy”
cost for not capturing the demand of other potential customers elsewhere.
Remark 1. Although the definition of inconvenience may be seem non-obvious
at first, it has some appealing properties. First, the range of U∗(x, u) is [0,∞).
Second, it is non-decreasing in the distance to the nearest other car. Alternatives
to inconvenience cost (1) such as −minv 6=u d(xu, xv) for a metric d are not
considered in this paper.
We define the social cost of an aggregate position x as:
C(x) := max
1≤u≤K
U∗(x, u) (2)
and the cost at the social optimum:
C∗ := min
x
C(x). (3)
We propose pricing models, where agent u pays a fee U(x, u) for dropping
their car at xu. This U(x, u) approximates the inconvenience U∗(x, u), while
being computable using local data. The specific functions are described later
(c.f. Eq. 7 on page 6).
A Dynamical Model in Discrete Time
Ultimately, we want to study an asynchronous dynamical system, where users
respond to the price by changing the positions, where they drop off their car.
This can be seen as a discrete-time problem, with time discretised by the points
in time, when a user drops the car off. Further, we assume the time when a user
drops the car off to coincide with a time, when another user picks up a car.
Formally, let us have a function pn : Z→ {1, 2, . . . , k}, which could take the
elements of the image in a cyclic order, for example. Some further examples will
be studied experimentally on page 10 below. Let us also have function Step,
which computes the set of minimisers argminxun∈QW (x, pn), picks one, and
scales the difference with respect to xn uniformly down across all coordinates
as little as possible, such that the Euclidean norm is less than or equal to smax,
as detailed in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 StepUsmax (x, pn) function of the discrete-time dynamics (4).
Input: x ∈ R2k are the k known positions of parked cars in 2D, p ∈ K is the
index of the car dropped off, and smax is the bound on the step-length.
1: M ← argminx∈Q U(x, pn), xpnn ,
such that only xun changes
2: m← argminm∈M ||m||,
which is unique by convexity arguments
3: D ← m− x, where the difference is element-wise
4: find the smallest c ≥ 1 such that ||S||/c ≤ smax
5: return S/c
Now, consider a model, where one parked car pn changes its position from
xpnn to x
pn
n+1 at every time step n ∈ 1, 2, . . . and the vector of position xn evolves
as:
xn+1 =
{
xkn − StepUsmax (x, pn) , if k = pn
xkn otherwise
(4)
where function Step is detailed in Algorithm 1. Notice that the cases in (4) can
be seen as demultiplexing with selector pn. Further, we define xn = x to be a
fixed-point if and only if xn+1 = x.
A Continuous-Time Approximation
We also consider a continuous-time, synchronous model, based on [6]. There,
all cars move in at the same time, so as to minimise some fee U(x, u) to be
paid, which is a function of the positions x an the agent u, which approximates
U∗(x, u). The dynamics can be formulated as:
d
dt
x(t) = −Ln
(
∂
(
argmin
x∈Q
U(x, u)
))
(x(t)). (5)
where Ln : 2R
k → Rk is a mapping that associates a subset S of Rk with its
least-norm element. For a locally Lipschitz function f , Ln(∂f) : Rk → Rk
is a generalized gradient vector field, given by x → Ln(∂f)(x). Although the
argminx∈Q U(x, u) is not guaranteed to be unique for a general U , Proposition
3.3 [6] suggests two functions U , for which the ∂ (argminx∈Q U(x, u)) has a
closed-form solution. There, vector −Ln(∂f)(x) is a direction of descent and is
guaranteed to exist as per Theorem 2.4 of [6]. Here, we define x(t) = z to be a
fixed point of the above dynamical system if and only if ddtx(t) = 0 .
Remark 2. One should see the continuous-time model as a synchronous ap-
proximation of an asynchronous process, in the limit of the number of users
parking at one time, and infinitesimally small time step. Alternatively, wihtin
the calculus on measure chains [7], one could formulate both models as dynam-
ics, which differ in the timescale, T = Z and T = R, respectively, and the limit
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mux / k-NN
pn
proj
V
demux
x1n
. . .
xKn D(xn, pn)
xpnn
miny∈∂(Q)||y−xpnn ||
StepVsmax(x, pn)
x1n+1
. . .
xKn+1
xn, pn
Figure 1: A block-diagram for the neighbourhood-based pricing V .
of the number of users parking at the same time, being 1 and k, respectively.
We do not attempt to answer the question of consistency of the approximation
of one model by another in this paper, other than in simulations for specific pn,
which seem encouraging.
Neighbourhood-Based Pricing V,W
In this section, we introduce two approximations of U∗. The approximations are
motivated by the fact that computing U∗ and the social cost (2) using pairwise
distances and distances to the boundary, for each agent, may be difficult. The
driver may be reluctant to disclose their position, in order for the computation
to be performed at a central server, thereby making it necessary to transfer the
positions of all parked cars to the driver, which may be time-consuming or costly
or both. The proposed approximation use only the set of distances D(x, u) of
|D(x, u)| parked cars closest to xu and a distance to the boundary. See a block
diagram in Figure 1, with k-NN, proj, and V referring to Line 1 of Step and
demux referring to (4).
Two natural approximations of U∗ for pricing of dropping car u considering
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positions x are:
V (x, u) := 1/min{1
2
min
y∈∂(Q)
||y − xu||, min
d∈D(x,u)
{d}} (6)
W (x, u) :=
1
2
min
y∈∂(Q)
||y − xu||+
∑
d∈D(x,u)
d
−1 . (7)
It remains unclear, however, how do the above approaches perform, in theory.
Is one V better than W? When? When do they perform as well as U∗ using
the complete information?
An Analysis of the Dynamics in Discrete Time
In order to answer these questions, we study the two models of the dynamics, in
turn. First, the dynamics in discrete time, i.e. with xn generated by (4), it may
seem rather difficult to reason about the limn→∞ sxn. Initially, we hence study
the problem of best-possible positions of parked cars within a region, at any time
n. This corresponds to the problem of of setting the positions in systems, where
the pick-up and drop-off have to be the same, e.g. ZipCar, and provides a lower
bound on the best possible outcome achievable using any pricing function U .
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Arbitrary Positions). At any time, the positions of all cars u
are distinct, but otherwise can be changed arbitrarily within a convex compact
polyhedron Q ⊆ Rd with non-empty interior.
Then:
Proposition 1 (Optimum Position). Under Assumption 1, the social optimum
C∗ as well as the best possible outcome with fee V or W ,
min
x∈Q
∑
u∈K
U∗(x, u), (8)
min
x∈Q
∑
u∈K
V (x, u), (9)
min
x∈Q
∑
u∈K
W (x, u), (10)
(11)
can be approximated to any arbitrary precision.
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice that the outcome is the same in both discrete and
continous time. The proof has two steps, which are the same for both discrete
and continous time, and relies heavily on the results of Bulgarin, Henrion, and
Lasserre [8] and the observation that each of U∗, V , and W is expressible by
6
fractional programming, where both the variable and constraints are given by
finite sums such as
∑
i
pi(·)
qi(·) and pi and qi are polynomials.
First, one needs to formulate an explicit fractional programming problem.
There are two minor complications. First, notice that the boundary of the
polygon is defined by a number of line-segments. The distance of a point xu0 ∈ R2
to a line segment L(a, b) connecting a, b ∈ R2 can be computed by a closed form
expression involving scalar p = ((x0 − a) · (b− a))/||b− a||, i.e.
||xu0 , L(a, b)|| =

||xu0 − a|| if p < 0
||xu0 − b|| if p > 1
||xu0 , a+ p(b− a)|| otherwise.
(12)
Next, notice that the taking of the minima, whose non-decreasing function is to
be maximised, e.g. for pred or succ in the adjacency model or for the minimum
of the distance to the boundary and the pair-wise distances, does not change
the problem profoundly, as it can be implemented by the addition of additional
variables and constraints, e.g. maxmin{a, b} = max c s. t. c < a, c < b.
The second step uses the technique of [8], who observe that
min
x
{
p(x)
q(x)
: x ∈ Q
}
(13)
= min
µ∈M(Q)
{∫
p(x)dµ(x) :
∫
Q
q(x)dµ(x) = 1
}
,
where M(Q) is the space of finite Borel measures on Q. From Assumption 1,
the set Q is compact and has non-empty interior. From the equivalence to
a generalised problem of moments [9], it follows that if Q is compact and its
interior is nonempty, then there exists a sequence of semidefinite programming
(SDP) relaxations Rr such that
(a) inf Rr → SU as r →∞.
(b) There is no duality gap between Rr and R?r .
(c) If (11) has a unique global minimizer x? ∈ Q, one can extract x? from Rr
for some r.
Remark 3. Under additional assumptions as per Theorem 3.1 of of [8], which
are not too restrictive, but non-trivial to formulate, one may prove finite conver-
gence. Bounds of the rates of convergence may solve a major open problem in
mathematical optimization, though. Indeed, notice the connection to the planar
geometric packing problem [10] and the Min-Max Multicenter [11, ND50], which
are NP-Complete.
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C(
argmin
x∈Q
max
u∈K
max
{
1
miny∈∂(Q) ||y − xu|| ,
2
minv 6=u ||xu − xv||
})
=
C
(
argmax
x∈Q
min
u∈K
min
{
min
y∈∂(Q)
||y − xu||, minv 6=u ||x
u − xv||
2
})
. (14)
Figure 2: The min-max exchange discussed in the first part of the proof of
Proposition 3.
Remark 4. Numerically, the social optimum and the best possible outcome
given a price function (11) can be computed using GloptiPoly3 [12]. Computing
the social optimum for more than 30 cars may be a challenge, though, consid-
ering the general fractional programming involved. In the special case, where
the price function is linear in x, it suffices to solve a linear program in order to
compute the outcome, but that seems too restrictive.
Analytically, it is clear:
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, for any U(x, u) 6= U∗(x, u) ∀x ∈ Qk,
u ∈ K, we have C∗ ≤ C (argminxminu∈K U(x, u)). For V in the neighbourhood
model, we have C∗ = C (argminxminu∈K V (x, u)).
An Analysis of the Dynamics in Continuous Time
The dynamics in continuous time, i.e. x(t) generated by (5) in continuous time,
provide a seemingly very crude approximation of the discrete-time sequence xn,
Nevertheless, in this continous-time approximation, one can show that x(t) (5)
converge to the best possible outcome for V .
Let us compare the social optimum corresponding to the inconvenience (1)
with the fixed point obtained by agents acting rationally to the price function
given by density approximation using the closest other agent. Under some
assumptions, which we unnecessarily strengthen in order to avoid rounding:
Assumption 2 (Square). There exists an integer i such that there are k = i2
agents and let the region of Assumption 1 be a unit square.
Proposition 3 (Convergence to the Optimum Position). Under Assumption 1
for d = 2, for any x0 ∈ Q, there exists a fixed point x∞ for:
d
dt
x(t) = −Ln
(
∂
(
argmin
x∈Q
V (x, u)
))
(x(t)). (15)
Furthermore, under Assumption 2, C∗ = C(x∞), i.e. the cost (2) of the outcome
of the dynamics (5) given by the rational response to the pricing with respect to
the neighbourhood-based price V , converges to the fixed-point x∞, whose cost is
at the social optimum (3), for any |D| ≥ 1 in finite time.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The proof has two steps. First, we show the equivalence
to another problem, and then we use the results of Cortés and Bullo [6] on the
equivalent problem.
First, we need to show that for distinct positions of agents, we can exchange
the min and max operators, as in (14).
Let us start with an easier problem:
C
(
argmin
x∈Q
max
u 6=v∈K
{
2
||xu − xv||
})
= (16)
C
(
argmax
x∈Q
min
u6=v∈K
{ ||xu − xv||
2
})
(17)
Let us consider a set A of k distinct vectors in R2 and two distinct vectors
xu, xv ∈ A, xu 6= xv. Clearly:
argmax
x∈A
||xu − xv|| = argmin
x∈A
1
||xu − xv|| (18)
Next, let us consider one of the non-unique:
(u∗, v∗) ∈ arg min
u,v∈K,u6=v
||xu − xv|| (19)
= arg max
u,v∈K,u6=v
1
||xu − xv|| (20)
Plug in (u∗, v∗) into (18) and multiply and divide by a constant as needed.
Notice that the non-uniqueness stems from the fact the pair of vectors xu, xv at
the optimum is non-unique, but that the distance ||xu − xv|| is the same across
the optima, and hence all the optima are equivalent with respect to C, which
considers only the distance ||xu − xv||. On both left- and right-hand side, we
hence obtain optima, which are equivalent with respect to C, as required in (17).
Finally, notice that the extension to the distances to the boundary only enlarges
the set of distances, among which to pick the optimum, where some of the points
are projections of vectors xu onto the boundary and the corresponding and the
corresponding distances are miny∈∂(Q) ||y − xu||.
The rest of the proof is based on the results of Cortés and Bullo [6] for:
argmax
x∈Q
min
u∈K
min
{
min
y∈∂(Q)
||y − xu||, minv 6=u∈K ||x
u − xv||
2
}
. (21)
Let us use the shorthand sm(u) := min
{
miny∈∂(Q) ||y − xu||, minv 6=u∈K ||x
u−xv||
2
}
in keeping with the notation of [6]. Notice that the continous-time dynamical
system capturing the rational response to computing the density based on the
distance to the closest car is:
x˙i(t) = −Ln(∂sm(u))(x(t)), (22)
9
where Ln is a mapping, which associates to each subset S of Rd the an
elements of S minimising the norm, as above. By Theorem 2.7 and Proposition
3.5 of Cortés and Bullo [6], the gradient flow corresponding to (4) results in the
so called “inscribed circle” partition, whose social cost (2) is clearly the same as
that of the uniform spacing.
Remark 5. Notice that Proposition 3 holds for any initial distribution of the
agents’ positions in the square, but the fixed point is not necessarily unique,
although all the non-unique fixed points have the same cost (2).
Remark 6. If one were to analyse the discrete-time dynamics (4), one needs to
consider the step-size, which makes the analysis considerably more complicated.
Notice that just as in Remark 3, one should not expect strong results on the rate
of convergence, especially for a general Q.
Illustrative Simulations
Further observations can be made using simple discrete-time simulations. First,
let us consider the consistency of the synchronous approximation of the asyn-
chronous process (4) in Figure 3. We compare the movement of a single car in
each step, using functions pn including:
• p1n: pick an element of {1, 2, . . . , k} uniformly at random, with no repetion
within interval [ik + 1, (i+ 1)k] for i = 0, 1, . . . 1
• p2n: pick an element {1, 2, . . . , k} uniformly at random, with repetition
• p3n := (n mod k) + 1, i.e. in in the cyclic order.
with the movement of all vehicles at the same time. In this example, which uses
“uniformdata” from Matlab’s gallery of matrices, the consistency seems near per-
fect, although we have not provided any guarantees or theoretical justification
as to why this should be the case.
Next, let us illustrate the fixed point of the discrete time dynamical system
(4) described in Proposition 3 above. Notice in Figure 3, again, that even a
small number of steps (4), albeit depending on the number of agents, suffices to
get close to the “inscribed circle” partition, which is socially optimal.
Next, notice that it is very easy to find examples, where a poor choice of
the pricing function results in convergence to a fixed point, which is far from
social optimum, or to a non-convergence. Consider, for instance, Figure 4, which
again compares the evolution of xn in a unit square, albeit with 8 instead of 9
points, this time varying the functions used in the neighbourhood-based price
V and W . Notice that the use of W does not lead to convergence to the socially
optimum, even within a unit square, in this example.
1 That is: if n = ik+ 1 for i = 0, 1, . . ., shuffle {1, 2, . . . , k}, and fix the order as O. In any
case, return the element at position (n mod k) + 1 of O.
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Figure 3: The evolution of xn in a unit square, considering U∗ and the bound on
the step length su = 0.05 for all u ∈ K. The top two rows illustrate the discrete-
time dynamics (4), where one driver changes position at any time, according
to p1 (top row) or p2 (middle row), in contrast to the bottom row, where all
drivers change position at the same time. In each row, there are plots for k = 9
and n = 1, 2, . . . 10k (left), k = 9 and n = 1, 2, . . . , 100k (center), and k = 33
and n = 1, 2, . . . , 100k (right). In each plot, the initial position is marked in
black, the final in blue, and positions inbetween in red. The Voronoi partition
corresponding to the final positions is plotted in blue, with the inscribed circles
in black.
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Figure 4: The evolution of xn in a unit square, considering V (top) and W
in the neighbourhood-based price. In each row, from left to right, xn for n
equal to k, 10k, and 100k (top), and n = 10k, 100k, and 1000k steps (bottom),
respectively. In each plot, we have used k = 9 and su = 0.05 for all u. The
initial position is marked in black, the final in blue, and positions inbetween in
red. The Voronoi partition corresponding to the final positions in blue, with
the inscribed circles in black.
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Related Work
The flexible car-sharing systems, allowing for one-way, open-ended journeys are
rather novel. First mentioned ten years ago [5, 1], the first implementations [2]
are only recently evaluated and studied in more detail. The first rigorous study
of the related optimisation problems is perhaps due to [13]. In contrast to many
studies [13, 14, 15], we do not pre-define the locations, and vary the costs.
In the context of bicycle sharing, the problem is somewhat different, but
there is a larger body of literature available. Specifically, whereas a car can
easily be parked anywhere, in principle, the bicycle often needs expensive street
furniture [16], and hence a pre-defined station. Further, whereas car-sharing
schemes are often operated by profit-seeking companies, the bicycle sharing
schemes are often run by the authorities, who want to keep prices low, and
often nominal. Two of the most advanced studies [17, 18] formulate a bi-level
optimisation problem capturing the equilibrium of the demand and supply, al-
though the exact solution remains a challenge, computationally. [19, 20, 21]
provide elaborate stochastic analyses of the performance of a closed queuing
system, associated with bicycle rentals. They show that without pricing and
with capacity limits at the stations, there are a number of stations where either
bikes are not available or no further bikes can be dropped off, even in a “homo-
geneous” city, which is well defined and in some sense the best possible. Among
other results, they also show that if a user provides his destination and the sys-
tem forces him to take the less full out of two closest stations, the performance
improves considerably. [22] formulate a more elaborate continuous-time Markov
chain model, and provide a heuristic for the setting of prices for dropping the
bicycle at a given station, specified at pick-up time. Part V of [23] suggests
model predictive control for the problem, where user arrives at a station to
drop off his bicycle, but is offered incentives for dropping the bicycle off at a
different station close-by, considering an approximation of the probability user
would cycle further in order to gain the incentive by a linear function of the
incentives, independent of the distance, and there being a known desirable “fill
level” at each station. Incentives have also been used in Paris, where used of
Vélib [16] get credits for leaving the bicycles at up-hill stations.
Conclusions
We have proposed a pricing scheme for car-sharing applications, which yields a
desirable spread of parked cars throughout the given region, under rather strong
assumptions, while removing privacy concerns, inasmuch the system operator
needs to know the position of the car only once it has been dropped off. Overall,
our analysis and simulations give quantitative guidance on how to design a
readily implementable, privacy-preserving, and efficient pricing scheme.
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